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COMMENTS
SOME PROBLEMS INVOLVING THE CALIFORNIA STATUTES
ON LANDLORD AND TENANT
By DAViD M. GuciAx'N
Several areas of uncertainty become apparent upon even a casual
reading of the California statutes dealing with the landlord and tenant rela-
tionship. The scope of this comment is limited to a discussion of some of
these problems which arise in connection with the statutory provisions for
the creation and termination of tenancies of uncertain duration. A study of
the related provisions for unlawful detainer proceedings would be very useful
but is not included at this time.
A difficulty encountered at the outset is the fact that the various pertinent
sections have not been gathered together in one continuously numbered
sequence. The arrangement of the sections adopted herein is one possibility
for the organization of the present statutes: other workable plans of organ-
ization are no doubt possible, but any comprehensive outline which would
bring all the related provisions together would be preferable to the present
scattering and utter lack of system.
A. Term of Lease When No Limit Is Specified
The tenancy from year to year and later the other forms of the periodic
tenancy were a development of the common-law tenancy at will,' and became
clearly distinguishable from it. The tenancy at will was terminable by either
party at any time without formal notice; it terminated upon the death of either
party, or by a conveyance by the lessor or attempted assignment by the lessee.
A tenant at will was entitled to emblements and was not liable for permissive
waste, because of the uncertain duration of his term.2 In contrast, the periodic
tenancy could only be terminated upon suitable notice. It did not auto-
matically terminate upon the death of either party nor by a conveyance by
the lessor. Further, the periodic tenancy was like a term of years in that
the tenant was liable for permissive waste, his right to emblements was
limited, and his interest was transferable and insurable.' The distinction
between these two types of tenancies as it existed at common law is here
emphasized because it has not always been observed under California law.
12 WALsH, LAw OF REAL PROPERTY 145 (1st ed., 1947).
11 AM mC LAW OF PROPERTY, § 3.28 (1st ed., 1952) ; 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, § 257
(1st ed., 1950) ; 1 TFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT, § 13b (1st ed., 1912) ; 2 WALsH, LAw OF REAL
PROPERTY, §§ 152, 154 (1st ed., 1947).
11 AmRCAN LAw OF PROPERTY, § 3.23 (1st ed., 1952) ; 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, § 255 (1st
ed, 1950); 1 TFAxy, LANDLORD AND TENANT, §§ 14a, 14d (1st ed., 1912); 2 WALsH, LAw oF
REAL PROPERTY, § 148 (lst ed., 1947).
(161)
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
In Tracy v. Donovan' the court said (with a reference to Civil Code, section
761)', ". . the defendant became a tenant from year to year ... We
are satisfied that it is a form of tenancy at will." Two later cases support
that proposition by inference.' The court mentioned this problem in Palmer
v. Zeiss,7 but failed to clear it up, saying only that a tenancy at will
"perhaps" includes a month-to-month tenancy. Although Civil Code, section
761, does not provide specifically for periodic tenancies in its classification
of estates according to their duration, such forms of holding are recognized
elsewhere in the California statutes; for example, Civil Code, section 1944,
refers to a monthly hiring, Civil Code, section 1946, provides for tenancies
from month to month, and Civil Code, section 827, begins with these words:
"In all leases of lands or tenements, or of any interest therein, from week to
week, month to month, or other period less than a month, . . ." Therefore,
even if periodic tenancies are included in the classification "estates at will"
for the purposes of Civil Code, section 761, it seems fair to conclude that
the two types of tenancies are recognized as distinct in California for most
purposes, since they are treated separately under other California statutes
discussed herein.
At common law a tenancy at will arose by inference of law in many
situations where no valid limitation of the duration of the letting was stated;
for example, under a general letting, oral or written, in which the term was
not fixed;' or where a tenant went into possession under a lease which was
invalid for any reason;' or where an entry was made during negotiations for
a lease which proved unsuccessful; 10 or where a prospective purchaser of
property went into possession before title was conveyed;11 or where a pur-
chaser of property went into possession under a void contract of sale. 2
However, a holding which began as a tenancy at will could become a periodic
tenancy if the parties reserved periodic rents. The ultimate determining
factor was the intention of the parties and although reservation of periodic
'37 Cal.App. 350, 351, 174 Pac. 113 (1918); see, also, Camp v. Matich, 87 CaLApp.2d 660,
197 P.2d 345 (1948).
"§ 761. Kinds of Estates.Estates in real property, in respect to the duration of their enjoy-
ment, are either:
1. Estates of inheritance or perpetual estates;
2. Estates for life;
3. Estates for years; or,
4. Estates at Will."
'Orly v. Russell, 53 Cal.App. 660, 200 Pac. 732 (1921); Downing v. Cutting Packing Co.,
183 Cal. 91, 190 Pac. 455 (1920).
'65 Cal.App.2d Supp. 859, 151 P.2d 323 (1944), citing Orly v. Russell, supra, n. 6.
12 WALSH, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 172 (1st ed., 1947).
11 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, § 3.27 (1st ed., 1952) ; 2 WALSH, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 173
(Ist ed., 1947).
"I1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, § 3.29, n. 6 (1st ed., 1952); 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY,
§ 256, n. 69 (lst ed., 1947).
"12 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, § 256, n. 70 (1st ed., 1947).
122 WA sH, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 172 (1st ed., 1947).
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rent was persuasive evidence of an intention to create a periodic tenancy,
other circumstances could overcome that evidence.1 3 It should be noted that
the period adopted for the estimation of the rent was more significant than
the intervals at which the rent was actually to be paid. 4 If a yearly rent was
to be paid in quarterly or monthly installments, a tenancy from year to year
was presumptively created; or if a monthly rent was originally agreed upon
but was paid irregularly, the creation of a month to month tenancy was pre-
sumed to have been intended. Of course, it was competent for the parties
to provide expressly for either a periodic tenancy or a tenancy at will and
in that way avoid judicial conjecture about their intentions.
In California the problem of the duration of a term when no limit is
fixed by the parties is dealt with in two code sections. Civil Code, section
1944, applies only to the hiring of lodgings and dwelling houses for an
unspecified term:
"Section 1944. Lodging and Dwelling Leases Presumed for Rental
Period.-A hiring of lodgings or a dwelling-house for an unspecified term
is presumed to have been for such length of time as the parties adopt for the
estimation of the rent. Thus a hiring at a monthly rate of rent is presumed
to be for one month. In the absence of any agreement respecting the length of
time or the rent, the hiring is presumed to be monthly."
There are almost no reported cases construing this section. One reason
for this may be the small monetary value of the rights involved in this type
of hiring. That suggestion was made by Professor Powell in his work on real
property:
"This type of estate is tremendously important sociologically in that
occupancy thereunder conditions the home life of a very substantial fraction
of the population. On the other hand, the financial smallness of the involved
rights results in a great dearth of reported decisions from the courts concern-
ing them."'I
The first sentence of Civil Code, section 1944, appears to create a pre-
sumption of a fixed term, that is, a term of years equal in length to the period
adopted by the parties for the estimation of rent. The last sentence of the
section creates a presumption of a "monthly" hiring in the absence of any
agreement respecting the length of time or the rent. The word "monthly"
probably means a tenancy from month to month, although that is not certain,
and the use of that terminology has been criticized as ambiguous.' 6
Civil Code, section 1943, applies to the hiring for an unspecified term
of realty other than lodgings and dwelling houses:
"Section 1943. Land Leases Presumed Annual.-A hiring of real prop-
"Il AMERIcAN LAW or PROPERTY, § 3.25, n. 5 (1st ed., 1952) ; 1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT,
§ 14b (2) (1st ed., 1912).
'I TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT 129, n. 482 (1st ed., 1912).
v2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 374 (1st ed., 1950).
"I TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT 119 (1st ed., 1912).
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erty, other than lodgings and dwelling-houses in places where there is no
usage on the subject, is presumed to be for one year from its commencement
uiless otherwise expressed in the hiring."
This section creates a presumption of a fixed term of one year, and has
been applied where the subject of the hiring was a restaurant,17 farm land,18
a packing house,"9 a stall in a market,2" and a hotel.2 ' The presumptions
raised by Civil Code, sections 1943 and 1944, are rebuttable. 2
Various California decisions have dealt with terms of indefinite dura-
tion without any reference whatsoever to these apparently applicable statutes.
For example, Carteri v. Roberts,2" is a leading case which holds that one
who takes possession of premises with permission of the owner during
unsuccessful negotiations for a lease is a tenant at will. There are dicta in
the opinion to the effect that a tenant in possession under an invalid lease
is a tenant at will,24 and that a vendee in possession under a void deed is
also.25 An early case, Hall v. Wallace,26 held that a prospective purchaser
in possession under an oral contract of sale is a tenant at will. On the
authority of the Hall case, it was held as a general proposition in Turney v.
Collins2" that a vendee in possession before title is conveyed is a tenant at
will; this is probably in conflict with the common law, 8 however (since a
vendee claims as owner, not as tenant) and is nowhere sanctioned by the
California statutes.29 Where a writing fixes a monthly rental but no certain
term of hiring, a tenancy from month to month has been held to have arisen.3"
None of these opinions discuss statutory presumptions but seem rather to be
in accord with common law principles (with the exception of the Turney
case).
There is no code provision for the creation of a periodic tenancy but
in general-the situations which gave rise to a periodic tenancy at common law
1TAaker v. Smith, 87 Cal.App.2d 36, 196 P.2d 150 (1948).
"
8Pierce v. Walter, 129 Cal.App. 228, 18 P.2d 345 (1933); Gabel v. Page, 6 CaLApp. 618,
92 Pac. 749 (1907).
"
9Randolph Marketing Co. v. Stevenson, 65 Cal.App. 1, 222 Pac. 849 (1923).
"
0Herman v. Rohan, 37 Cal.App. 378, 174 Pac. 379 (1918).
*"Brill v. Carsley, 2 Cal.App. 331, 84 Pac. 57 (1905).2 Neither presumption is included in Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 1962, which is a list of the
only presumptions deemed conclusive or indisputable under the California codes.
"'140 Cal. 164, 73 Pac. 818 (1903); followed in Linnard v. Sonnensohein, 94 Cal.App. 729,
272 Pac. 315 (1928).
"
4See, also, dictum in Pacific Coast Joint Stock Land Bank of San Francisco v. Jones, 14 Cal2d
8, 92 P.2d 390 (1939). Cf. Phelan v. Anderson, 118 Cal 504, 50 Pac. 685 (1897).
"See, also, Hayden v. Collins, 1 Cal.App. 259, 81 Pac. 1120 (1905).
2688 Cal. 434, 26 Pac. 360 (1891).
"'48 CaLApp.2d 381, 119 P.2d 954 (1941).
l1 A ,mucAx LAw oF PROPERTY, § 3.9, n. 3 (1st ed., 1952).
'This holding may be the result of confusing the situation of a vendee in possession under a
valid contract of sale -with that of a vendee in possession after rescission of the contract to sell. See
Simpson v. Applegate, 75 Cal. 342, 17 Pac. 237 (1888) ; Frisbie v. Price, 27 Cal. 253 (1865).8
"Watkins v. McCartney, 57 Cal.App. 643, 207 Pac. 909 (1922) ; Flournoy v. Everett, 51 Cal.App.
406, 196 Pac. 916 (1921).
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do so under the California decisions. In Linnard v. Sonnenschein," the
Court said:
". . . the holding is at will, which by the acceptance of rent may become
a tenancy from month to month or from year to year. If the rent is paid
monthly, the tenancy becomes one of month to month, or if it be agricultural
land and the rent is paid annually, the tenancy is from year to year."
B. The Effect of Holding Over
It was well-settled at common law that a landlord had the option of
treating a tenant holding over after the expiration of his lease either as a
trespasser, or as a tenant for a new period. The tenancy which arose upon
the landlord electing to treat the party holding over as a tenant was generally
considered to be a one year term; and this resulted though the holding over
was slight, and in spite of any contrary desire on the part of the tenant."
Obviously this rule worked a hardship on tenants in many instances and there
has been a tendency by the courts to find ways of mitigating its harshness."5
Only one California code section, Code of Civil Procedure, section
1161(2), applies to the case of a tenant holding over without an expression
of acceptance or non-acceptance by the landlord, and this section applies
only to a hiring of agricultural lands:
"Section 1161(2).... In all cases of tenancy upon agricultural lands,
where the tenant has held over and retained possession for more than 60 days
after the expiration of the term without any demand of possession or notice
to quit by the landlord or the successor in estate of his landlord, if any there
be, he shall be deemed to be holding by permission of the landlord or suc-
cessor in estate of his landlord, if any there be, and shall be entitled to hold
under the terms of the lease for another full year, and shall not be guilty of
an unlawful detainer during said year, and such holding over for the period
aforesaid shall be taken and construed as a consent on the part of a tenant
to hold for another year."
This section works a rather radical change in the common law since
it places a burden on the landlord to speak within 60 days or be bound for
another year, whereas at common law the tenant was bound for another year
by holding over a day or two. It was held in Pierce v. Walter34 that the
landlord's demand for possession must be in writing; but the opinion does
not mention Swithenbank v. Wood 5 in which the Court upheld the validity
of acts and words which constituted notice without a writing. It is settled by
the decisions that the presumption raised by this section is rebuttable. 6 There
194 CalApp. 729, 735, 272 Pac. 315, 318 (1928).
821 AMERiCAN LAW OF PROPERTY, § 3.33 (1st .ed., 1952) ; 2 WALSH, LAw OF REAL PROPERTY,
§ 149 (1st ed., 1947).
"I AMRucAN LAw or PROPERTY, § 3.34 (1st ed., 1952).
"4129 Cal.App. 228, 18 P.2d 345 (1933).
"899 CaLApp. 341, 278 Pac. 496 (1929).
"Cowell v. Snyder, 171 Cal. 291, 152 Pac. 920 (1915), citing Ambrose v. Hyde, 145 Cal. 555r
79 Pac. 64 (1904) ; followed in Swithenbank v. Wood, supra, n. 35.
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would seem to be nothing in the section to prevent the landlord before
expiration of the 60 days from exercising either alternative of the option
he had at common law; that is, of treating the tenant holding over as a
trespasser or as his tenant for another period. Though the rule of this section
was unknown to the common law, it is by no means unique. Substantially
similar provisions regarding agricultural lands are in effect in several states"r
and Kentucky has even extended its application to leases in general.3"
Often a tenant will hold over after expiration of his lease and tender
rent payments for the additional periods which are accepted by the land-
lord. This situation is covered by Civil Code section 1945:
"Section 1945. Implied Renewal of Lease.-If a lessee of real property
remains in possession thereof after the expiration of the hiring, and the lessor
accepts rent from him the parties are presumed to have renewed the hiring
on the same terms and for the same time, not exceeding one month when the
rent is payable monthly nor in any case one year."
The phraseology of this section might lead one to believe that the term
resulting from the holding over would be a fixed term, that is, a term of years
for one month, when the rent is payable monthly. 9 The opinion of the court
in Kaye v. M'Divani4 suggests that view. Speaking of a holding over with
the landlord's consent the Court said:
"In any event, in the absence of evidence of a distinct agreement, it
would by law be a renewal of the tenancy for a period of one month, since
the rental under the written lease was paid in monthly payments. Civ. Code,
§ 1945."
The following language from Hull v. Laugharn4' seems to support the
same view: "The tenancy for years resulting from a holding over by consent
of the landlord rests upon implication only." But there is ample California
authority to support the interpretation that a tenancy from month to month
is presumptively created by this section."
There is some doubt as to whether the tenancy thus created is a new
one or a continuation of the old. Before enactment of Civil Code section 1945
in 1872, it was held in Blumenberg v. Myers43 that the circumstance of a
landlord accepting rent from a holdover tenant created a new tenancy subject
to the terms and conditions of the old lease. The first case affecting this
problem which was decided under Civil Code, section 1945, was Woods v.
"
7Mont. Rev. Codes, § 9889 (1939); Nev. Comp. Laws, § 9136 (1929); Utah Code Ann.,
§ 104-604 (1949) ; Wash. Rev. Stat., § 813 (1940).8 Ky. Rev. Stat., § 383.160(1), (2) (1949). See, also, La. Civ. Code, § 2689 (Dart, 1932).
112 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 380, n. 37 (1st ed., 1950).
406 CalApp.2d 132, 134, 44 P.2d 371,372 (1935).
3 Cal.App.2d 310, 314, 39 P.2d 478, 480 (1934).
"Renner v. Huntington-Hawthorn Oil and Gas Co., - Cal. -, 244 P.2d 895 (1952) ; Earle v.
Kelly, 21 CaLApp. 480, 132 Pac. 262 (1913) ; Agar v. Winslow, 123 Cal. 587, 56 Pac. 422 (1899).
'"32 Cal. 93 (1867).
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Bank of Haywards" in which the Court clearly states that the tenancy aris-
ing under Civil Code, section 1945, was not a new tenancy. The Court makes
no reference to Blumenberg v. Myers. Earle v. Kelly45 was a case involving
a fact situation similar to that of Woods v. Bank of Haywards and without
mentioning the Woods case the Court reached the opposite result, holding
that a new tenancy was created under Civil Code, section 1945. Two later
cases have some bearing on the question, Kaye v. M'Divani4 treating the
tenancy arising under Civil Code, section 1945, as a new tenancy, and Knox
v. Wolfe"7 treating it as a continuation of the old tenancy; but the Court
in the Knox case probably based their determination of this point on the
fact that the lease gave the lessee an option to renew without executing a
new lease. The majority view elsewhere seems to be that a holdover tenancy
is a new tenancy. ". . . although the holdover tenancy generally is subject
to the same terms and conditions as the prior lease, it is clear that it is a
new tenancy and not simply an extension or renewal of the first lease." '
The presumption raised by Civil Code, section 1945, that the parties
renewed the hiring on the same terms is rebuttable. In fact, according to
Brill v. Carsley49 conflicting presumptions under Civil Code, section 1943,
and Civil Code, section 1945, arise upon a holding over with the landlord's
consent where the subject of the hiring is real property other than lodgings
or dwelling houses. The subject of the lease in the Brill case was a private
hotel and the Court held that the facts reinforced the presumption arising
under Civil Code, section 1943, thereby overcoming the presumption created
by Civil Code, section 1945. A similar holding may be found in Aaker v.
Smith;"0 but the Court seems to be on firmer ground in Herman v. Rohan,"
wherein it held that an original letting of a stall in a market for an unspecified
term at a monthly rental presumptively created a one year term under Civil
Code, section 1943, and that a holding over beyond the year with the land-
lord's approval presumptively created a month to month tenancy under Civil
Code, section 1945.
C. Notice to Terminate or Change
At common law the continuance of a tenancy at will depended on the
concurrence of the will of the landlord with that of the tenant. Consequently
either party could terminate the tenancy without advance notice-the tenant
by moving off, and the landlord by demanding possession or even by the
"10 Cal.App. 93, 106 Pac. 730 (1909).
"21 Cal.App. 480, 132 Pac. 262 (1913).
"Supra, n. 40.
"'73 Cal.App.2d 494,167 P.2d 3 (1946).
"1 AMERcAN LAw OF PROPERTY 242 (1st ed., 1952).
"Supra, n. 21.
"Supra, n. 17.
"Supra, n. 20.
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doing of acts inconsistent with an intent to continue the relationship (such as
an entry by the landlord to cut timber).2 This element of terminability
without advance notice did not protect the interests of either party satis-
factorily and was responsible, according to one theory, for the evolution of
the periodic tenancy.53 It was also responsible for the enactment of statutes
in many states requiring notice as a prerequisite to termination of tenancies
at will, and in California this was done by Civil Code, section 789:
"Section 789. Estates at Will.-A tenancy or other estate at will, how-
ever created, may be terminated by the landlord's giving notice in writing
to the tenant, in the manner prescribed by section 1162 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, to remove from the premises within a period of not less than thirty
days, to be specified in the notice."
The wording of this section clearly requires notice to be given by the
landlord, but it does not clearly require notice by the tenant. Tiffany inter-
prets this section as impliedly authorizing a tenant at will to terminate with-
out advance notice.54 There are no California cases which touch upon this
problem, and therefore there is no solution to it at present.
It should be remarked that notice given under this section may expire
at any time, and its expiration need not coincide with the expiration of an
interval between rent payments-a requirement which existed at common law.
Since the enactment of Civil Code, section 789, in 1872, it has been held
that a tenancy at will is terminated by the death of the lessor," by the death
of the lessee, 6 and by an attempt by the lessee to assign his interest. '
Whether or not the parties may expressly provide for a tenancy at will
terminable without advance notice as at common law, does not seem to have
been passed on by the California courts. There is a dictum in Nye v. Dotta5
to the effect that if a lessor has the right to terminate without notice under
a lease, that a tenancy at will is created which necessitates 30 days' notice
under Civil Code, section 789, for its termination. Also there are cases
(Turney v. Collins,59 for example) which emphasize that by the terms of
Civil Code, section 789, a tenancy at will, however created, may be termi-
nated by 30 days' notice; but there is no conclusive holding in California
on this point.
As originally enacted Civil Code, section 789, provided for a notice
"
2Blum v. Robertson, 24 Cal. 127 (1864), has a statement of the common law to the effect that
acts of ownership by the lessor inconsistent with a tenancy at will terminate such tenancy.
"Il AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 222 (1st ed., 1952).
Il TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT 1423. "Some of the statutes are so phrased as to require
a notice to be given only by the landlord, thus by implication authorizing the tenant to terminate
the tenancy immediately, without formal notice, as at common law,..." (citing Cal. Civ. Code,
§ 789).
:'Joy v. McKay, 70 Cal. 445, 11 Pac. 763 (1886).50Dugand v. Magnus, 107 Cal.App. 243,290 Pac. 309 (1930).
"McLeran v. Benton, 73 Cal. 329, 14 Pac. 879 (1887).
'- Cal. -, 245 P.2d 529 (1952).
"'19 Cal.2d 162, 119 P.2d 954 (1942).
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of not less than one month. Several opinions carelessly substituted 30 days'
notice in satisfaction of the statutory requirement,6" and in 1911 Civil Code,
section 789, was amended to provide for a notice of not less than 30 days
instead of one month.
When periodic tenancies first were recognized by the common law, a
reasonable length of time was required for notice of termination. This elastic
requirement was crystallized by custom and the rule came to be that notice
to terminate a year-to-year tenancy bad to be given at least six months before
expiration of a year period, and notice to terminate other periodic tenancies
bad to be given at least as long before the tenancy was to be terminated as
a period of the tenancy itself. In any case the expiration of the notice to
terminate had to coincide with the end of a period of the tenancy.6
Civil Code, section 1946, deals with the notice required to terminate
periodic tenancies:
"Section 1946. Notice Required to Terminate Lease.-A hiring of real
property, for a term not specified by the parties, is deemed to be renewed as
stated in the last section, at the end of the term implied by law unless one of
the parties gives written notice to the other of his intention to terminate the
same, at least as long before the expiration thereof as the term of the hiring
itself, not exceeding 30 days; provided, however, that as to tenancies from
month to month either of the parties may terminate the same by giving at least
30 days' written notice thereof at any time and the rent shall be due and
payable to and including the date of termination. It shall be competent for
the parties to provide by an agreement at the time such tenancy is created
that a notice of the intention to terminate the same may be given at any time
not less than seven days before the expiration of the term thereof. The notice
herein required shall be given in the manner prescribed in section 1162 of
the Code of Civil Procedure."
It may be significant that this section expressly provides for notice by
either of the parties,62 in contrast with the wording of Civil Code, section 789,
which apparently requires notice by the landlord only.
From the time of its enactment in 1872 until the year 1947 Civil Code,
section 1946, provided for one month's notice.63 During that time the courts
often referred to 30 days' notice as the requirement for terminating a month-
to-month tenancy.64 The section was finally amended in 1947 to require 30
days' notice, thereby conforming to the requirement in effect since 1911 in
Civil Code, section 789, of 30 days' notice to terminate a tenancy at will.
Before the amendment of Civil Code, section 1946, in the year 1947
0°Carteri v. Roberts, 140 Cal. 164, 73 Pac. 818 (1903); Ivory v. Brown, 137 Cal. 603, 70 Pac.
657 (1902).012 WALr, LAw or REAL PRoPERTY 146 (1st ecL, 1947).
"Dor v. Oppenheim, 45 CaL.App. 312, 187 Pac. 462 (1920).
"An example of the correct application of this provision may he found in Psihozios v. Humberg,
80 Cal.App.2d 215, 181 P.2d 699 (1947).
"Greenberg v. Koppelow, 76 CaLApp.2d 631, 173 P.2d 821 (1946) ; Wagner v. Havard, 87 Cal.
App. 310, 262 Pac. 47 (1927) ; Downing v. Cutting Packing Co., 183 Cal. 91, 190 Pac. 455 (1920).
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it was apparently necessary under this section for notice to expire at the end
of a period of the tenancy, as at common law. "The effect of a notice under
section 1946, Civil Code, is, as stated therein, to prevent a renewal of the
existing lease at the end of its term (implied by law), and this means that
at the end of that term the lease expires by lapse of the time provided (by
implication) for its duration."65 Italics by the Court.
Since the amendment of this section, however, 30 days' notice that
expired during a period of the hiring has been sanctioned." 6
Civil Code, section 1946, seems to prohibit the parties from expressly
providing for notice to terminate to be given less than seven days before
the expiration of a term of the tenancy."r Several cases have given approval
to an express provision superseding the notice required by statute,68 but
no cases have been found dealing with an attempt to provide for less than
seven days' notice. It is conceivable that this portion of Civil Code, section
1946, is an unwarranted interference with the freedom of the parties to
contract. Perhaps the Legislature enacted this provision in view of the
shortage of accommodations which impairs the bargaining power of tenants
as a class and in an effort to create an equality in bargaining power without
which practical freedom of contract is impossible.
Civil Code, section 827, provides for changing of terms of a tenancy
from month to month, week to week, or other period less than a month:
"Section 827. Change of Terms of Month to Month or Week to Week
Lease.-In all leases of lands or tenements, or of any interest therein, from
week to week, month to month, or other period less than a month, the land-
lord may, upon giving notice in writing to the tenant, in the manner pre-
scribed by Section 1162 of the Code of Civil Procedure, change the terms of
the lease to take effect, as to tenancies for less than one month, upon the
expiration of a period at least as long as the term of the hiring itself, and, as
to tenancies from month to month, to take effect at the expiration of not les
than 30 days, but if such change takes effect within a rental term, the rent
accruing from the first day of such term to the date of such change shall be
computed at the rental rate which obtained immediately prior to such change;
provided, however, that it shall be competent for the parties to provide by
an agreement in writing that a notice changing the terms thereof may be given
at any time not less than seven days before the expiration of a term, to be
effective upon the expiration of such term. The notice, when served upon the
tenant, shall of itself operate and be effectual to create and establish, as a part
of the lease, the terms, rents, and conditions specified in the notice, if the
tenant shall continue to hold the premises after said notice takes effect."
"Palmer v. Zeiss, 65 Cal.App.2d Supp. 859, 863, 151 P.2d 323, 325 (1944). Also, see, Downing
v. Cutting Packing Co., supra, n. 64.
"Wheeler v. Bainbridge, 84 Cal.App.2d Supp. 849, 191 P.2d 134 (1948).
"The following discussion of this limitation on the power of the parties to provide for notice
different from the statutory notice, applies also to a similar prohibition appearing in Cal. Civ. Code,
§ 827 (discussed below), with regard to the power of the parties to expressly provide for notice
to change the terms of a periodic tenancy different from the statutory notice.
"Devonshire v. Langstaff, 10 Cal.App.2d 369, 51 P.2d 902 (1935); Watkins v. McCartney,
57 Cal.App. 643, 207 Pac. 909 (1922).
COMMENTS
This section, logically enough, is worded so as to apply only to land-
lords. This may be some indication that the use of similar language in Civil
Code, section 789, was meant to exclude 30 days' notice as a requirement
of termination of tenancies at will by a tenant.
There is some authority to the effect that a periodic tenancy may be
terminated by notice under Civil Code, section 827. In Alden v. Mayfield, 9
for example, the Court said: "Mrs. Alden then immediately consulted her
attorney, and upon May 2, 1910, served upon defendant a formal notice to
quit and surrender possession upon the last day of May, 1910. Civ. Code,
§ 827." The Court seems to clearly reject this view in the leading case of
Colyear v. Tobriner:0
"We are of the view that section 827 does not apply to the case herein.
Defendants did not, in the language of section 827, 'purport to change the
terms of the lease,' and thereafter continue an existing tenancy on changed
terms. Instead in clear and unequivocal language they 'terminated' the
tenancy as of midnight December 9, 1934."
But the Court apparently misconstrued the holding in the Colyear case
in Hudson v. Zumwalt:71
"The tenancy from month to month could not lawfully be terminated for
nonpayment of rent for the month of July, except upon notice as provided
by either section 1161, subdivision 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, or sec-
tion 827 of the Civil Code."
There is no dearth of statutory provisions in California for the termina-
tion of the landlord-tenant relationship, and it is difficult to see any good
reason for broadening the effect of Civil Code, section 827, to include that
function.
From 1907 onward this section provided for a month's notice to change
the terms of a month-to-month tenancy; in 1947 the month's notice provision
was struck out and a provision for 30 days' notice was substituted.
The only significant related code section which today still sets forth a
requirement of one month's notice instead of 30 days' notice is Civil Code,
section 3345,7" relating to penal damages. Rather than change Civil Code,
section 3345, to conform in this respect with other sections dealing with
notice, it would be better to repeal it, because it has been held to have been
impliedly repealed by Code of Civil Procedure, section 1174 (as amended
in 1907), in the case of Field v. Wahon. 3 It is the opinion of the Court
"164 Cal. 6, 8, 127 Pac. 45, 46 (1912).
7'7 Cal.2d 735, 742, 62 P.2d 741, 745 (1936).
"64 CalApp.2d 866, 874, 149 P.2d 457, 461 (1944).
7 § 3345. After Demand and Notice to Quit.-If any tenant, or any person in collusion with
the tenant, holds over any lands or tenements after demand made and one month's notice, in writing
given, requiring the possession thereof, such person holding over must pay to the landlord treble
rent during the time he continues in possession after such notice."
7194 Cal.App. 596, 271 Pac. 500 (1928).
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that the companion provision, Civil Code, section 3344,74 was also impliedly
repealed by Code of Civil Procedure, section 1174, but that would seem to
be dictum since Civil Code, section 3344, was not before the Court at that
time.
The Court in the Field case displays an unusually fine analysis of the
problem before it, and a sure hand in paring away superfluous Code provi-
sions. It would be a great service if the Legislature would do likewise, and
revise the California statutes on landlord and tenant into a clear and mean-
ingful whole.
711"§ 3341. Holding Over After Termination of Tenancy.-If any tenant give notice of his
intention to quit the premises, and does not deliver up the possession at the time specified in the
notice, he must pay to the landlord treble rent during that time he continues in possession after
such notice.:'
